CHAPTER XLIV

Retrospect.

It would be supposed that the writer, who had fought by the side of nearly all, and who had visited battlefields where troops from every State had fallen, could form an idea of "Which were the best troops from the South?" The South has furnished a type of the true soldier that will last as a copy for all time. She had few regulars, and her volunteer troops were brought into service without preparation or without the knowledge of tactical drill, but in stoicism, heroism, and martyrdom they excelled the world.

I give in these pages a brief synopsis of the characteristics of the troops from different States, and while this is the view of the author alone, still I feel assured that the great mass of the old soldiers will admit its correctness. To the question, "Which were the best troops from the South?" there would be as many answers and as much differences of opinions as there were States in the Confederacy, or organizations in the field, as each soldier was conscientious in his belief that those from his own State were the best in the army, his brigade the best in the division, his regiment the best in the brigade, and his own company the best in the regiment. This is a pardonable pride of the soldier, and is as it should be to make an army great. Where all, individually and collectively, were as good or better than any who ever before faced an enemy upon a battlefield, there really are no "best."

But soldiers from different States, all of the same nationality and of the same lineage, from habits, temperaments, and environments, had different characteristics upon the field of battle. From an impartial standpoint, I give my opinion thus:

The Virginians were the cavaliers of the South, high-toned, high-bred, each individual soldier inspired by that lofty idea of loyalty of the [533]

cavalier. They were the ideal soldiers in an open field and a fair fight. They were the men to sweep a battle line that fronts them from the field by their chivalrous and steady courage. Virginia, the mother of Presidents, of great men, and noble women, the soldier of that State felt in honor bound to sustain the name and glory of their commonwealth. As a matter of fact, the Virginians, as a rule, with exceptions enough to establish the rule, being one of the oldest of the sister States, her wealth, her many old and great institutions of learning, were better educated than the mass of soldiers from the other States. They were soldiers from pride and patriotism, and courageous from "general principles." In an open, fair field, and a square and even fight, no enemy could stand before their determined advance and steady fire. They were not the impulsive, reckless, head-strong soldiers in a desperate charge as were those from some other Southern States, but cool, collected, steady, and determined under fire. They were of the same mettle and mould as their kinsmen who stood with Wellington at Waterloo.

The North Carolinians were the "Old Guard" of the Confederacy. They had little enthusiasm, but were the greatest "stickers" and "stayers" on a battle line of any troops from the South. They fought equally as well in thicket or tangled morass as behind entrenchments. To use an army expression, "The North Carolinians were there to stay." It was a jocular remark, common during the war, that the reason the North Carolina troops were so hard to drive from a position was "they had so much tar on their heels that they could not run." They were obstinate, tenacious, and brave.

South Carolinians took on in a great measure the inspirations of some of their French Huguenot ancestors and the indomitable courage of their Scotch and German forefathers of the Revolution. They were impulsive, impetuous, and recklessly brave in battle, and were the men to storm breastworks and rush to the cannon's mouth at the head of a "forlorn hope." They possibly might not stay as long in a stubbornly contested battle as some from other States, but would often accomplish as much in a few minutes by the mad fury of their assault as some others would accomplish in as many hours. They were the Ironsides of the South, and each individual felt that he had a holy mission to [534]

fulfill. There were no obstacles they could not surmount, no position they would not assail. Enthusiasm and self-confidence were the fort of South Carolinians, and it was for them to raise the Rebel yell and keep it up while the storm of battle raged fierce and furious. They were the first to raise the banner of revolt, and right royally did they sustain it as long as it floated over the Southland.

What is said of the South Carolinians can be truthfully said of Georgians. People of the same blood, and kindred in all that makes them one, they could be with propriety one and the same people. The Georgians would charge a breastwork or storm a battery with the same light-heartedness as they went to their husking bees or corn-shucking, all in a frolick. To illustrate their manner of fighting, I will quote from a Northern journal, published just after the seven days' battles around Richmond, a conversation between Major D., of the —— New York, and a civilian of the North. The Major was boasting in a noisy manner of the courage, daring, and superiority of the Northern soldiers over those of the South." Well, why was it," asked the civilian, "if you were so superior in every essential to the Rebels, that you got such an everlasting licking around Richmond?" "Licking, h——l," said the wounded Major, "who could fight such people? Indians! Worse than an Apache.

Just as we would get in line of battle and ready for an advance, a little Georgia Colonel, in his shirt sleeves and copperas breeches, would pop out into a corn field at the head of his regiment, and shout at the top of his voice, 'Charge!' Man alive! here would come the devils like a whirlwind—over ditches, gullies, fences, and fields, shouting, yelling, whooping, that makes the cold chills run up your back—flash their glittering bayonets in our very faces, and break our lines to pieces before you could say 'boo.' Do you call that fighting? It was murder." No more need be said of the Georgians.

Little Florida did not have many troops in the field, but little as she was, she was as brave as the best. Her troops, like those of Georgia and South Carolina, were impulsive, impetuous, and rapid in battle. They were few in numbers, but legions in the fray.

The Alabamians and Mississippians came of pioneer stock, and like their ancestry, were inured to hardships and dangers from childhood; [535]

they made strong, hardy, brave soldiers. Indifferent to danger, they were less careful of their lives than some from the older States. They were fine marksmen; with a steady nerve and bold hearts, they won, like Charles Martel, with their hammer-like blows. They were the fanatical Saraceus of the South; while nothing could stand before the broad scimeters of the former, so nothing could stand in the way of the rifle and bayonet of the latter.

The Louisianians were the Frenchmen of the South. Of small stature, they were the best marchers in the army. Like their ancestors in the days of the "Grand Monarch," and their cousins in the days of the "Great Napoleon," they loved glory and their country. Light-hearted and gay in camp, they were equally light-hearted and gay in battle. Their slogan was, "Our cause and our country." The Louisianians were grand in battle, companionable in camp, and all round soldiers in every respect.

The Texan, unlike the name of Texan immediately after the war, when that country was the city of refuge for every murderer and cut-throat of the land, were gallant, chivalrous, and gentlemanly soldiers. Descendants of bold and adventurous spirits from every State in the South, they were equally bold and daring in battle, and scorned the very word of fear or danger. Hood's old Texas Brigade shared honors with the old Stonewall Brigade in endurance, courage, and obstinacy in action. The soldiers of Texas were tenacious, aggressive, and bold beyond any of their brethren of the South.

The Tennesseeans, true to the instincts of their "back woods" progenitors, were kind-hearted, independent, and brimful of courage. Driven from their homes and firesides by a hostile foe, they became a "storm center" in battle. They were combative and pugnacious, and defeat had no effect upon their order, and they were ever ready to turn and strike a foe or charge a battery. Their courage at Chickamauga is distinguished by showing the greatest per cent of killed and wounded in battle that has even been recorded, the charge of the Light Brigade not excepted, being over forty-nine per cent.

What is said of the Tennesseeans is equally true of the Arkansans. Of a common stock and ancestry, they inherited all the virtues and [536]

courage of their forefathers. The Confederacy had no better soldiers than the Arkansans—fearless, brave, and oftentimes courageous beyond prudence.

The border States' soldiers, Missourians, Kentuckians, and Marylanders, were the free lance of the South. They joined the fortunes of the South with the purest motives and fought with the highest ideals. Under Forrest and Morgan and the other great riders of the West, they will ever be the soldiers of story, song, and romance. Their troops added no little lustre to the constellation of the South's great heroes, and when the true history of the great Civil War shall be written, they will be remembered. Indomitable in spirits, unconquerable and unyielding in battle, they will ever stand as monuments to the courage of the Southern Army.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE WAR—ITS LOSSES IN KILLED AND DIED.

What were the Confederate losses during the war? Where are the Confederate dead? Which State lost the most soldiers in proportion to the number furnished the war? These are questions which will perhaps be often asked, but never answered. It can never be known, only approximately. The cars containing the Confederate archives were left unguarded and unprotected at Greensboro on its way from Richmond, until General Beauregard noticed papers from the car floating up and down the railroad track, and had a guard placed over them and sent to Charlotte. There was a like occurrence at this place, no protection and no guard, until General Johnston had them turned over to the Federal authorities for safe keeping. Consequently, the Confederate rolls on file in Washington are quite incomplete, and the loss impossible to ever be made good.

The Federal authorities commenced immediately after the war to collect their dead in suitable cemeteries, and the work of permanently marking their graves continued systematically until the Federal loss in the war can be very accurately estimated. There are seventy-five public cemeteries for the burial of the Federal soldiers, in which are buried three hundred and sixty thousand two hundred and seven; of these, one hundred and thirty-nine thousand four hundred and ninety-six are marked unknown. There were thirty-three thousand five hundred and twenty negro soldiers buried in the cemeteries, and more than fifty [537] thousand Union dead never accounted for A great number of these fell by the wayside during "Sherman's march to the sea;" lost by "Sherman's rear guard," called by the Federal soldiers "Confederate bushwhackers"

The rolls of the Confederate dead in the archives at Washington, given by States, are very unsatisfactory and necessarily incomplete Only two States can even approximate their loss. But as this is the record in Washington, I give it.

In the above it will be seen that North Carolina, which may be considered approximately correct, lost more than any other State. Virginia furnished as many, if not more, troops than North Carolina, still her losses are one-third less, according to the statistics in Washington. This is far from being correct. Alabama's dead are almost eliminated from the rolls, while it is reasonable to suppose that she lost as many as South Carolina, Mississippi, or Georgia. South Carolina furnished more troops in proportion to her male white population than any State in the South, being forty-five thousand to August, 1862, and eight thousand reserves. It is supposed by competent statisticians that the South lost in killed and died of wounds, ninety-four thousand; and lost by disease, one hundred and twenty-five thousand.

In some of the principal battles throughout the war, there were killed out right, not including those died of wounds—

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There were many other battles, some of greater magnitude than the above, which are not here given. There are generally five wounded to one killed, and nearly one-third of the wounded die of their wounds, thus a pretty fair estimate of the various battles can be had. There were more men killed and wounded at Gettysburg than on any field of battle during the war, but it must be born in mind that its duration was three days. General Longstreet, who should be considered a judge, says that there were more men killed and wounded on the battlefield at Sharpsburg (or Antietam), for the length of the engagement and men engaged, than any during this century.

The Union losses on the fields mentioned above exceeded those of the Confederates by thirteen thousand five hundred in killed and died of wounds.

There were twenty-five regular prison pens at the North, at which twenty-six thousand seven hundred and seventy-six Confederate prisoners died, tabulated as follows:

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War is an expensive pastime for nations, not alone in the loss of lives and destruction of public and private property, but the expenditures in actual cash—gold and silver—is simply appalling. It is claimed by close students of historical data, those who have given the subject careful study, that forty million of human beings lose their lives during every century by war alone. Extravagant as this estimate may seem, anyone who will carefully examine the records of the great conflicts of our own century will readily be convinced that there are not as much extravagance in the claim as a cursory glance at the figures would indicate. Europe alone loses between eighteen, and twenty million, as estimated by the most skillful statisticians. Since the time of the legendary Trojan War (three thousand years), it is supposed by good authority that one billion two hundred thousand of human, beings have lost their lives by the hazard of war, not all in actual battle alone, but by wounds and diseases incident to a soldier's life, in addition to those fallen upon the field.

In the wars of Europe during the first half of this century two million and a half of soldiers lost their lives in battle, and the country was impoverished to the extent of six billions eight hundred and fifty millions of dollars, while three millions of soldiers have perished in war since 1850. England's national debt was increased by the war of 1792 to nearly one billion and a half, and during the Napoleonic wars to the amount of one billion six hundred thousand dollars.

During the last seventy years Russia has expended for war measures the sum of one billion six hundred and seventy million dollars, and lost seven hundred thousand soldiers. It cost England, France, and Russia, in the Crimean war of little more than a year's duration, one billion five hundred million dollars, and five hundred thousand lives lost by the four combined nations engaged.

But all this loss, in some cases lasting for years, is but a bagatelle in comparison to the loss in men and treasure during the four years of our Civil War.

According to the records in Washington, the North spent, for the equipment and support of its armies during the four years of actual hostilities, four billion eight hundred million in money, outside of the millions expended in the maintenance of its armies during the days of Reconstruction, and lost four hundred and ten thousand two hundred [540]

and fifty-seven men. The war cost the South, in actual money on a gold basis, two billion three hundred million, to say nothing of the tax in kind paid by the farmers of the South for the support of the army. The destruction and loss in public and private property, outside of the slaves, is simply appalling. The approximate loss in soldiers is computed at two hundred and nineteen thousand.

The actual cost of the war on both sides, in dollars and cents, and the many millions paid to soldiers as pensions since the war, would be a sum sufficient to have paid for all the negroes in the South several times over, and paid the national debt and perhaps the debts of most of the Southern States at the commencement of the war.

This enormous loss in blood and treasure on the part of the South was not spent in the attempts at conquest, the subversion of the Union, or the protection of the slave property, but simply the maintenance of a single principle—the principle of States Rights, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.