BOOK IV. _ANALYTICA

BOOK IV. _ANALYTICA_

In contrast to the ten long chapters of III, IV is divided into forty-two short ones: i-v, _analytica_ in general; vi-viii, _demonstrativa_; ix-xx, the progress of knowledge: sensus, imaginatio, prudentia, ratio, intellectus; xxi-xxiii, _hypothetica_, _sophistica_; xxiv-xlii, critical review: objectors to Aristotle the place of _logica_ in teaching, typical conceptions of ratio, and of truth and error, the relation of ratio to veritas.

This last book iterates the importance of correlation (xxviii. 982 B). “But though _logica_ is useful generally, he who is ignorant of other arts[37] is not so much helped by it toward philosophy as he is hindered by a habit of verbosity and presumption. For _logica_ is almost useless if it be alone. It stands out when it shines by the power of correlated studies.”

John’s slighting of rhetoric cannot be explained merely by his preoccupation with logic. Why was he thus preoccupied in a consistent and progressive scheme of the whole Trivium? He begins with a _logica_ embracing all studies of words; he devotes a whole book to _grammatica_; in his last pages he is speaking of an _organon_ that shall be a minister to _eloquentia_. Yet _rhetorica_ he merely mentions when he must. That he was aware of its ancient importance in such a scheme as his is evident from his large use of Quintilian’s _Teaching of Rhetoric_. No other medieval writer gave this work more attention. The much-quoted chapter (I. xxiv) on _prælectio_ uses not only Quintilian’s ideas, but his very words;[38] and other correspondences are no less significant. The following list, though not complete, is typical.

QUINTILIAN, _INST. ORAT._ _METALOGICUS_

I. iii. 3-5 II. viii. 865 B-C

Illud ingeniorum ... decrescit. Hoc est quod ... decrescit.

I. viii. 13-14 I. xxiv. 853 D-854 A

In prælegendo grammaticus ... In prælegendo grammaticus ... memoriam agitet. memoriam auditorum.

17-21 855 B-D

Præcipue vero illa ... Id quoque inter prima ... aliqua nescire. aliqua ignorare [with substitution of Augustine for Didymus, who is relegated to 864 C].

The correspondences above, verbatim for considerable stretches, involve here and there transpositions or other variations. The following are quotations or adaptations.

I. iv. 5-6 I. xxv. 856 D

Quo minus sunt ferendi ... in libro _De institutione oratoris quam ostentationis. Ne quis ..._ Ait ergo: “Ne quis igitur ... scientiam possit. [and the two sentences are quoted in reverse order].”

II. iii. 3 II. vii. 864 D

Propter quod Timotheum ... Refert Quintilianus [quotation with slight verbal variation].

II. iv. 5-7 IV. xxviii. 932 B

Nec unquam ... quod exculpi. Teneræ tamen ætati ... improbitas conquiescat [correspondence evident in idea, occasionally in word].

X. i. 83 II. ii. 859 A

Quid Aristotelem?... quid de eo dicat Quintilianus: clariorem putem. “Quid Aristotelem?... [exact quotation].”

X. i. 125-131 I. xxii. 852 B

Ex industria Senecam ... [Discusses Quintilian’s view (“ut quod voluit efficit. pace Quintiliani loquar”) with occasional reminiscence of his words.]

Even if these correspondences were confined to Quintilian’s first and second books, there would still be no sufficient ground for the inference that John, consulting him primarily for _grammatica_ and further for his general ideas on education, did not think of him as a rhetorician. For Quintilian not only presents rhetoric from the beginning; he frequently in these first books cites and quotes Aristotle as a rhetorician. But the matter seems to be put beyond doubt by the use of Book X. It is only fair to assume of so careful a scholar reading the first books and one of the last, and occupied with Quintilian’s idea of educational sequence, that he read the whole work.[39]

Having read and admired one of the chief ancient works on rhetoric, why did he leave rhetoric out of his own scheme? The answer is probably in the contemporary conditions to which the _Metalogicus_ is adjusted, and especially in the contemporary state of rhetoric. It seems not to have been in the twelfth century worth more than mention from a John of Salisbury seeking a vital sequence of studies. It lacked what he sought above all, vital relations. If he had known Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_, he might conceivably have sought to recall the ancient study to its better ancient aim. What he found vital in Quintilian’s rhetoric he transferred to _grammatica_ or to _dialectica_, partly, no doubt, because the transfer was actually going on, partly, one may think, because he saw in these other studies the real opportunities of his time for composition. The current lore of ornament which passed for rhetoric could hardly detain his consideration.

What he discerns in _grammatica_, and had found in the teaching of Bernard, is of course training in precision. But though he makes much of this, he does not slight the value of concreteness for presentation; he sees the importance of studying style by imitation; and he adopts from Quintilian a word not common in medieval treatises, _œconomia_. All these point to composition; and composition seems to have been one of the essential applications of the master’s analysis. The _prælectio_ as John describes it is tinged with Quintilian because it realizes fully the ancient function of _grammatica_ with the poets.

In the rapidly expanding teaching of _dialectica_ also he sees opportunity for composition. To this end, very likely, he urges repeatedly that the debates of the schools keep touch with reality by insisting on subject matter through correlation with other studies. Above all he desires that language studies be unified and progressive, that they call for expanding correlation of _inventio_ and _iudicium_. The study that in his time actually demanded and exercised these was not _rhetorica_, which was by way of ignoring both; it was _dialectica_.