Chapter 4 of 58
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA
Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law · Joseph Rickaby
p. 31. Aristotle calls the end [Greek: to telos]; the means, [Greek: ta pros to telos] (St. Thomas, ea quae sunt ad finem); the circumstances, [Greek: ta ein ois hae praxis].
Observe, both end and means are willed directly, but the circumstances indirectly.
The end is intended, [Greek: boulaeton]; the means are chosen, [Greek: proaireton]; the circumstances are simply permitted, [Greek: anekton], rightly or wrongly. The intention of the end is called by English philosophers the motive; while the choice of means they call the intention, an unfortunate terminology.
p. 42, §. 3. "As the wax takes all shapes, and yet is wax still at the bottom; the [Greek: spokeimenon] still is wax; so the soul transported in so many several passions of joy, fear, hope, sorrow, anger, and the rest, has for its general groundwork of all this, Love." (Henry More, quoted in Carey's Dante, Purgatorio, c. xviii.) Hence, says Carey, Love does not figure in Collins's Ode on the Passions.
p. 43. For daring read recklessness.
p. 44. Plato is a thorough Stoic when he says (Phaedo 83) that every pleasure and pain comes with a nail to pin down the soul to the body and make it corporeal. His Stoicism appears in his denunciation of the drama (Republic, x. 604).
p. 47, §. 8. The first chapter of Mill's Autobiography, pp. 48-53, 133-149, supplies an instance.
p. 49, §. I, 1. 2, for physical read psychical.
P. 52. §. 5. This serving, in [Greek: douleuein], St. Ignatius calls "inordinate attachment," the modern form of idolatry. Cf. Romans vi. 16-22.
p. 79. For spoiled read spoilt.
p. 84, foot. For ways read way.
p. 85, 1. 6 from foot. Substitute: ([Greek: b]) to restrain the said appetite in its irascible part from shrinking from danger.
p. 94, middle. For others read other.
p. 95. For Daring read Recklessness.
p. 103, middle. Substitute, "neither evening star nor morning star is so wonderful."
p. 106, §. 6. Aristotle speaks of "corrective," not of "commutative" justice. On the Aristotelian division of justice see Political and Moral Essays (P. M. E.), pp. 285-6.
p. 111, §. 4. The static equivalent of the dynamic idea, of orderly development is that the eternal harmonies and fitnesses of things, by observance or neglect whereof a man comes to be in or out of harmony with himself, with his fellows, with God.
p. 133. To the Readings add Plato Laws, ix, 875, A, B, C, D.
p. 151. Rewrite the Note thus: The author has seen reason somewhat to modify this view, as appears by the Appendix. See P. M. E. pp. 185-9: Fowler's Progressive Morality, or Fowler and Wilson's Principles of Morals, pp. 227-248.
p. 181, 1. ii from top. Add, This is "the law of our nature, that function is primary, and pleasure only attendant" (Stewart, Notes on Nicomathean Ethics, II. 418).
p. 218, lines 13-16 from top, cancel the sentence, To this query, etc., and substitute: The reply is, that God is never willing that man should do an inordinate act; but suicide is an inordinate act, as has been shown; capital punishment is not (c. viii. s. viii. n. 7, p. 349).
p. 237. For The Month for March, 1883, read P. M. E., pp. 215-233.
p. 251. To the Reading add P. M. E., pp. 267-283.
p. 297, l.6 from foot. After simply evil add: Hobbes allows that human reason lays down certain good rules, "laws of nature" which however it cannot get kept. For Hobbes and Rousseau see further P. M. E., pp. 81-90.
p. 319, middle. Cancel the words: but the sum total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States.
pp. 322-3. Cancel §. 7 for reasons alleged in P. M. E., pp. 50-72. Substitute: States are living organizations and grow, and their powers vary with the stage of their development.
p. 323, § 8. For This seems at variance with, read This brings us to consider.
p. 338. To the Readings add P. M. E., pp. 102-113.
p. 347, middle. Cancel from one of these prerogatives to the end of the sentence. Substitute: of every polity even in the most infantine condition.
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I. ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Moral Philosophy is the science of human acts in their bearing on human happiness and human duty.
2. Those acts alone are properly called human, which a man is master of to do or not to do. A human act, then, is an act voluntary and free. A man is what his human acts make him.
3. A voluntary act is an act that proceeds from the will with a knowledge of the end to which the act tends.
4. A free act is an act which so proceeds from the will that under the same antecedent conditions it might have not proceeded.
An act may be more or less voluntary, and more or less free.
5. Moral Philosophy is divided into Ethics, Deontology, and Natural Law. Ethics consider human acts in their bearing on human happiness; or, what is the same thing, in their agreement or disagreement with man's rational nature, and their making for or against his last end. Deontology is the study of moral obligation, or the fixing of what logicians call the comprehension of the idea I ought. Ethics deal with [Greek: to prepon], "the becoming"; Deontology with [Greek: to deon], "the obligatory". Deontology is the science of Duty, as such. Natural Law (antecedent to Positive Law, whether divine or human, civil or ecclesiastical, national or international) determines duties in detail,—the extension of the idea I ought,—and thus is the foundation of Casuistry.
6. In the order of sciences, Ethics are antecedent to Natural Theology; Deontology, consequent upon it.
Readings.—St. Thos., in Eth., I., lect. 1, init.; ib., 1a 2æ, q. 1, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 58, art. 1, in corp.